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In this study I present some evidence on the credit channel of monetary transmission in India. Using the set 
up of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) it is found that loans, investments and deposits of commercial banking 
system respond significantly to a monetary policy shock. Results to a positive shock to monetary base are 
as expected. Investments respond almost immediately and then taper whereas deposits permanently settle 
at a higher level. Loans respond more slowly and are seen to move contemporaneously with output after a 




After in a series of studies Bernanke recorded empirical support for the credit channel of 
monetary transmission for the US
1 the ‘credit view’ has come to be accepted as key to 
explaining the transmission of monetary policy
2. While Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) 
dismiss this role altogether, Bernanke (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that in 
addition to affecting short term interest rates, monetary policy affects output by affecting 
the availability of new loans.  
 
As a recent annual report of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI Annual Report, 1999-2000) 
notes, in India, the transmission channels of monetary policy have been influenced by 
gradual liberalization of the financial markets, steady diffusion of financial innovations, 
increasing exposure of corporate and financial sectors’ balance sheets to market, and 
growing trade and financial integration between domestic and international markets. 
Using alternative frameworks, studies by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
3 suggest that 
credit channel is extremely relevant in analysing the transmission of monetary policy in 
India. 
 
This study offers some additional evidence on the credit view in the Indian context 
following the methodology of Bernanke and Blinder (1992). In particular, VAR 
specifications are employed to model the response of balance sheet variables of the 
                                                 
1 Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) among others  
2 see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap and Stein (200) 
3 see Joshi and Bhattacharya (1999) and Mishra (2003) commercial banks (bank credit, investments and loans) to exogenous shocks to policy 
variable.  
 
All of this, of course, is contingent on the assumption that either monetary base or the call 
rate responds elastically to changes in the other. Or, in other words, if monetary base is 
indeed a measure of policy stance, it should be unresponsive to contemporaneous 
changes in the money market interest rates and vice versa, i.e. given its ‘targeted’ level 




Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), exercise in VAR is an attempt to study the 
dynamic effects of monetary policy on the balance sheet of commercial banks. If the 
credit view is indeed ‘true’, commercial banks’ balance sheet variables should respond to 
changes in policy variables, to the extent these changes are exogenous and do not react to 
contemporaneous changes in non-policy (economic) variables.  
 
Although, RBI has declared that it is using base money as its operating target for 
monetary policy, it is important to check for the exogeneity (in the sense of Engle, 
Hendry and Richard, 1983) of monetary base to changes in short term interest rates (and 
vice versa) before the response of balance sheet variables to changes in the appropriate 
policy indicator can be assessed. The problem is essentially of identification. For either 
variable to be a good measure of policy stance, it must be unresponsive to 
contemporaneous changes in the other. 
 
The plan of the study is as follows. After a brief discussion of the credit view in Section 
II, in Section III I perform exogeneity tests to determine the appropriate indicator of 
policy stance of monetary policy, which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous changes 
in non-policy variables. In Section IV I empirically assess the credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission by evaluating the response of commercial banks’ balance sheet 
                                                 
4 In the Indian context the problem is complicated by sterilization in face of growing short term capital 




II. The Credit View 
 
The credit view rests on the assumption of asymmetric information and imperfect 
substitutability of loans and securities
5. Expertise of financial institutions enable them to 
extend loans to agents who cannot get loans in open market – because of expensive 
screening and evaluation. Thus,  in the words of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
 
“…when the Federal Reserve reduces the volume of reserves, argue, and 
therefore of loans, spending by customers who depend on bank credit must fall, and 
therefore so must aggregate demand.
6” 
 
Also, because of lack of perfect substitutability between loans and securities, a fall in 
reserves leads to a decline in loans, and thereby aggregate demand, albeit with a lag. 
Infact, as Bofinger (2001) quotes Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
 
“…the effect of monetary policy on banks’ loan supply schedules is on top of any 
increase in there in interest rate on open market securities such as Treasury Bills.
7” 
 
Bofinger criticizes the credit view saying that it subsumes that the effect of increase in 
refinancing rate of the central bank has mutually exclusive effects on the interest rates 
and the availability and terms of new bank loans. However, this is because of the price 
theoretic model of money supply that Bofinger (2001) uses, in which  
 
“…the reduction of reserves goes hand-in-hand with an increase in the central 
bank refinancing rate.
8” 
                                                 
5 see Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)  
6 B. Bernanke and A. Blinder “The Federal Funds Rate and Channels of Monetary Transmission,”   
American Economic Review, 82, 4, p. 901 
7 P. Bofinger, Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies and Instruments, OUP, Chapter 4, p. 86 
8 Bofinger, op cit Chapter 4, p. 90 In the standard multiplier analysis of money supply, the ‘macroeconomic market for 
money’ is totally absent. By introducing a market for credit in which banks maximize 
return on their portfolio, the credit view is already incorporated. Thus, the value of price 
theoretic model of money supply of Bofinger (2001) is because of the credit channel and 
not despite it. 
 
 
III. Which ‘Policy Variable’? 
 
To measure the response of the balance sheet variables of the commercial banks we need 
an indicator of policy stance which is uncorrelated with contemporaneous shocks to the 
money market. 
 
We adopt three approaches, none of which perfect in their own right, but when seen 
together would give a clue as to the more acceptable policy variable of call rate and 
monetary base. Our sample, as in other models estimated in the study, is the period 
between April 1992 and March 2002, i.e. a 10 year data sampled at monthly frequency.  
 
 
¾  Simple Regression/Correlation Analysis 
 
As a first indicator we look at the contemporaneous correlation between adjusted 
monetary base and the call rate, i.e. we estimate the following regressions i.e. with call 
rata and monetary base in both levels and first differences after adjusting for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Results are presented below. In all 
cases the coefficient of r is quantitatively zero with a negative sign. Thus, if we ignore 
endogeneity problem for the time being, simple contemporaneous correlation analysis 






 Case 1:  tt t br α βε = ++  
  Coefficient  Pr > |t| 
Intercept 11.55    <0.0001 
r (call rate)  -0.000078   0.7462 
AR1 -1.0125    <.0001 
ARCH0 0.0000472 0.0853 
ARCH1 0.4026  0.0069 
GARCH1 0.5093  0.0016 
Case 2:  tt t br α βε ∆ =+ + 
  Coefficient  Pr > |t| 
intercept 0.0154  <0.0001 
∆r (call rate)  -0.000318  0.0479 
AR1 0.2623 0.0128 
AR2 0.2619 <.0001 
ARCH0 0.0000923 0.0026 
ARCH1 0.8903  0.0027 
GARCH1 0.0328  0.7283 
Case 3:  tt t br α βε ∆ =+ ∆ + 
  Coefficient  Pr > |t| 
intercept 0.0126  <0.0001 
∆r (call rate)  -0.000139  0.5316 
AR1 0.2212 0.0243 
AR2 0.2343 <.0001 
ARCH0 0.0000776 0.0112 
ARCH1 1.0664  0.0013 




¾  Weak Exogeneity Tests 
 
The second test we employ is to test for exogeneity (in the sense of Engle, Hendry and 
Richard, 1983) of monetary base to call rate. This we analyse in a VAR framework. 
Essentially we look for cointegration between monetary base and call rate and check for 
weak exogeneity by imposing restrictions on the vector of adjustment coefficient. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that although call rate is a unit root process going by the 
conventional Dickey Fuller type tests, as shown by Virmani (2004), using tests with 
better size adjusted power properties in small samples, call rate is stationary. Selecting lag length using AIC and BIC, a VAR with three lag of each was specified. 
Both Trace test and maximum Eigen value tests pointed towards one cointegration 
vector. Results are given in table below: 
 
 
Determination of Reduced Rank 
 
  H0: r = 0  H0: r <= 1 
Trace Statistic   23.97 (15.34)*  0.54 (3.84) 
Maximum Eigen Value
9  23.43 (14.07)*  0.54 (3.76) 
           * - Significant at 5% (Critical values given in parentheses) 
  
 
Given that there exists one cointegration vector we can test for weak exogeneity of the 
two variables with respect to other. Estimation using Johansen’s procedure allows for a 
Chi-square test of restriction on the row of the adjustment coefficient vector 
 
Weak Exogeneity Test 
      
Variable Chi-square  Probability 
r  <0.0001* 
b  0.1135 
 
Thus, while adjusted monetary base is weakly exogenous to call rate, vice versa is not 
true. Though, results from this test also are only indicative and cannot be relied upon 
outright, they still point towards a plausible exogenous policy variable in monetary base. 
 
The above VECM (3) can be given the following VAR representation: 
 
0.55 0.0042 0.07 0.00012 0.37 0.0002
20.88 0.47 0.29 0.017 20.39 0.098
t1 t2 t3 t
t
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Note that coefficient of all lagged r terms in the above equation are quantitatively not any 
different from zero. 
 
¾  The Supply/Demand of Bank Reserves: The Monetary Base/Call Rate Schedule 
                                                 
9 Alternative in case of Maximum Eigen Value test is closed-ended; i.e. H1: rank = r + 1  
The final test we employ is similar to the one performed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). 
They argue that for monetary base/funds rate to be an indicator of monetary policy 
actions, changes in monetary base/short rate should be unresponsive to contemporaneous 
changes in short-term liquidity conditions/reserve demand. Econometrically, the problem 
is of identification of the monetary base/call - rate schedule  
 
They look at the correlation in innovations between the funds rate and monetary base 
from a five variable VAR comprising three macroeconomic indicators each, reserves and 
funds rate, i.e. they look for information in leading macro indicators as an instrument to 
provide ‘identify’ the slope of the reserves/funds rate schedule. In this study we employ a 
VAR comprising IIP, adjusted monetary base, call rate and the price level with lag length 
of four, selected using Sims’ (1980) Likelihood Ratio test criterion.  
 
Although, true, as Bernanke and Blinder argue, typically a central bank will have much 
more information than just on IIP (in the Indian case), so that may effect RBI’s decision 
on monetary base, leading to possible endogeneity problem. However, we are constrained 
for lack of availability of high frequency data on leading economic indicators in the 
Indian context, and must content ourselves with only partial evidence on 
contemporaneous correlations in innovations in call rate and monetary base.  
 
Below we report results from innovations in call rate and monetary base from the four 
variable VAR. We look at the correlation in innovations and estimate the slope of 
innovations in monetary base on innovations in call rate using the Generalized Method of 








¾  Correlation in Innovations: Simple Regression  
br t ee α βε ∆ =+ ∆ + 
 
  Coefficient  Pr > |t| 
intercept -0.000019  0.9850 
r e ∆ (call rate innovations)  -0.000862 -2.35 
AR1 0.0433  0.7277 
AR2 0.0499  0.4389 
ARCH0 0.000113  <.0001 
ARCH1 0.5375  0.0059 
 
 
¾  Correlation in Innovations: Instrument Variable Estimation (GMM) 
 
br t ee α βε ∆ =+ ∆ + 
 
  Coefficient  Pr > |t| 
intercept 0.000169  0.8988 
r e ∆ (call rate innovations)  -0.00078 -2.21 
 
 
It is clear from all estimations above, notwithstanding their limitations, that (change in) 
monetary base is not contemporaneously correlated with call rate or its innovations. Thus, 
monetary base presents itself as an appropriate policy variable to measure the stance of 
the central bank.  
 
 
IV. Examination of Credit Channel of Monetary Transmission 
 
The balance Sheet data for our VAR analysis for credit route of monetary transmission is 
obtained from Schedule 3 of the monthly RBI Bulletin. We use the item called Aggregate 
Deposits (item no. 5 in the Schedule) for deposits, the item called Bank Credit for loans, 
and the item Investment for securities. In particular, we estimate the following VARs 
(with exogenous variable, adjusted monetary base coming first in the autoregression): 
 ¾  A 5-variable VAR comprising real adjusted monetary base, deposits, investments, 
loans and output (i.e. all deflated by price level, in this case WPI) 
 
¾  A 6-variable VAR comprising nominal  adjusted monetary base, deposits, 
investments, loans, output and the price level 
 
Instead of using IIP to proxy income we use monthly output series created by Virmani 
and Kapoor (2003). The series in that study is provided till March 2000. We extend the 
series till Mar 2002 using regression based extrapolation. In particular we specify a 
regression function for each month as a function of the quarter to which it belongs and 
time. From the same study we have roughly 17 years of monthly and quarterly data. 
Then, given the quarterly estimates from CSO for the period from April 2000 to March 
2002, we can get the estimates of monthly output for the entire sample period. All 
variables enter in their natural logarithm.  
 
The results of interest from this VAR analysis is the dynamic effect of a shock to 
monetary base on deposits, investments, loans, and output. This can be best seen by 
looking at the impulse response function of the variables to a shock to monetary base.  
 
Results are reported for lag lengths 1, 2, 4, and 6. See Exhibit 1. For lack of degrees of 
freedom, results from higher order VARs would be unreliable, although we did notice 
that results from higher order VAR followed the pattern of the corresponding lower order 
VARs with the difference that impulse response from the former were more erratic. 
 
All estimations in the study were carried out using MATLAB using ‘vare’ and related 
procedures available in Prof. LeSage’s econometric toolbox.  
 
The plots represents a standard (Cholskey) decomposition based impulse response 
functions (IRFs) to a positive one standard deviation shock to monetary base over a 
horizon of 24 months. 
 From the IRFs it is apparent that easy money policy does cause the level of deposits to go 
up whether we consider in ‘real’ or ‘nominal’ terms. The effect to shock in deposits is 
almost instantaneous with saturation levels reaching around the 12 month mark, and from 
there on appears to be permanent.  
 
Now for increase in liabilities of the commercial banking sector, the asset side too must 
get affected. While rise in investments (in G-Secs and other approved securities) is more 
steep compare to rise in loans, with time (around the 5 – 8 month mark) investments taper 
off and in some cases note that they ‘return’ to their normal level while loans settle at a 
higher level.  
 
Thus, the first effect of increase in deposits is higher level of investment in securities, and 
a gradual rise in loans over time. This should be expected because changing the portfolio 
at the long end, especially as regards to claims, involves screening and entering into long-
term contracts, and thus loans take a longer time to show effect. 
 
The effect on output is quite surprising. Unlike what one would expect, easy money 
causes the output in nominal terms to increase almost instantaneously, while in real terms 
response from VARs does not present any clear cut picture. Though, the fall around 2-3 
months after is seen in all cases. Except for VAR(1) in real terms, when it is seen to rise 
monotonically – though this is unlikely to be the case because output is seen to settle 
permanently at a higher level. In most other cases, output rises initially, adjusts, and in 
around 8 – 12 months settle to the normal levels. The instantaneous effect is a sign that 
monetary policy does have quite a strong effect on the real sector in the short-run. 
 
The other thing that one finds – which is similar to what Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
notice for the U.S. in their study – is the co-movement in loans and output after around 8 




 V. Conclusion  
 
We find strong evidence in favour of credit channel of monetary transmission. First we 
note that monetary base is contemporaneously uncorrelated with call rate using 
alternative tests, and thus we chose monetary base as an indicator of policy stance of the 
central bank. Then analysing the balance sheet of the commercial banking system as a 
whole we find that claims and output move together after economy has adjusted to the 
‘first-round’ effects of policy induced. shocks. This is significant as it shows that claims 
form an important channel of monetary policy transmission and that as also shown by 
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¾  Impulse Response Function from VAR with variables in ‘Real’ terms  
 
 